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A contract signature is a particular form of digital multi-signature that only in-
volves two signers. Contract signing plays a critical role in any business transaction,
particularly in situations where the involved parties do not trust each other. One of the
most significant concerns in exchange signatures is the fraudulent and unfair exchange,
which occurs when one party gets the signature of another party without giving his
own signature. In the view of these security concerns, this thesis presents a secure
and fair contract signature scheme based on key exchange protocol. The security and
protection of the proposed scheme is based on solving hard computational assumptions
such as discrete logarithm problem (DLP). The proposed protocol is abuse-free. The
proposed scheme targets to have lesser computational overhead and high-security fea-
tures than existing scheme[1]. The proposed scheme has wide application in real life
scenarios, such as in electronic cash system.
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With the increase in the amount of information in the present technical scenario, the need
for security has also mushroomed. Apart from the size and amount, the worth of the infor-
mation has also rose. Like any other asset of an organization, company or even individual
information is the most valuable asset of all. The decline in the remoteness of the information
and the ever evolving Web Applications adds to the need for increasing the confidentiality
of the information and making it secure. In the present day, most of the communication
takes place on the insecure channel that makes the message vulnerable to multiple attacks
and threats. Creating a secure channel is very expensive and unscalable. While passing
information over an insecure channel such as Internet to a person we must provide four
different primary security requirements such as[10, 11],
• Confidentiality - Ensures protection from unauthorized persons.
• Integrity - Ensures the consistency of data.
• Authentication - Ensures the true identity of a person or an originator of a message.
• Non-repudiation - - Ensures no denial of communication.
These are the primary security goals that a secure system must satisfy for a successful
communication. Earlier confidentiality was the only significant concern. In the last few
years the other security parameters such as integrity verification, user authentication, digital
signatures, etc. have been considered relevant to the confidentiality factor.
1
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1.1 Introduction to Cryptography
Until recently cryptography referred almost exclusively to encryption, which is the process
of converting ordinary information (called plain text) into unintelligible text (called cipher
text).Decryption is the reverse, in other words, moving from the unintelligible cipher text
back to plain text. A cipher (or cypher) consists of two algorithms; one that encrypts the
message and the reverse decrypts the message. The key is the controlling instance in both
of the algorithms. It is a secret (ideally known only to the communicants), usually a short
string of characters, which is needed to decrypt the cipher text. While Symmetric Key
Cryptography (shared key) was used earlier, they are kind of obsolete now due to various
advancements in the technological field and the introduction of different algorithms for
checking primality. Now-a-days Asymmetric Key Cryptography is preferred everywhere[10,
11]. So we can classify the cryptography into two parts:
• Symmetric Key Cryptography (shared key)
• Asymmetric Key Cryptography (different key)
1.1.1 Symmetric Key Cryptography
In symmetric key cryptography, the sender of the message encrypts the message by using
the key "k". After receiving, the receiver, then decrypts the same message using the same
key "k". The assumption is based on the fact that, both the sender and receiver use a shared
common key and the transmission of the cipher text, and the key is done using an insecure
channel. This system is vulnerable to threats if the key "k" is leaked and it is known to an
adversary[10].
1.1.2 Asymmetric Key Cryptography
To overcome this particular problem of the symmetric key cryptography, the public key
cryptosystem is used, where everything is same except few exception. First of all, there are
two keys instead of one, one public key and one private key. To send a message securely,
the sender encrypts his message with the receiver’s public key. To decrypt the message,
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the receiver uses his private key. The concept of Public Key Cryptography gave rise to
the significant concept of Digital Signature. Electronically digital signature is analogous
to the traditional handwritten signature. The main purpose of the digital signature is to
enable a person to sign some electronic document digitally. One would wish for these digital
signatures to have the equivalent properties as traditional signatures: they should be easy
to generate, easy to verify and yet difficult to forge. By using the private key for signing,
and the public key for verifying, this notion was successfully achieved. With time, many
other variations of public-key cryptosystems and digital signatures were proposed[10].
1.2 Digital Signature
A digital signature checks and verifies whether an electronic document is authentic or not[13].
Digital signatures are mostly used to identify electronic entities for on-line transactions.
A valid digital signature gives user a reason to consider that the information or message
was created by a known authentic sender, such that the sender cannot deny that he has
sent the message and that the message was unaltered in transmission. A digital signature
uniquely recognizes the originator of digitally signed data and also guarantees the integrity
of the signed data against corruption and misuse. Digital signatures are commonly used for
software distribution, authenticate on-line entities, verify the origin of digital data, detect
forgery attack.[12] A common digital signature procedure is shown in Figure 1.1 [13].
1.3 Contract Signature
Contract signing plays a critical role in any business transaction, particularly in situations
where the involved parties do not trust each other. For instance, both the individuals sign
two hard copies of the same contract at the same time and at the same place. After that,
each keeps one copy as a valid and legal document that shows both of them have made
commitments to the contract. If any one of them does not abide by the contract, the
other one could provide the signed contract to a judge in the court. Cryptographic digital
signatures have been used to provide non-repudiation services, such as signing a business
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Figure 1.1: Digital Signature
contract. One class of multi-party protocols in the coming days can be the exchange of digital
signatures. One of the most significant concerns in exchange signatures is the fraudulent and
unfair exchange, which occurs when one party gets the signature of another party without
giving his own signature[1, 4]. The notion of fairness is well established in a traditional
message exchange, in which all parties involved obtain secrets simultaneously. However,
in a network environment, secrets are exchanged over a network that does not provide a
simultaneous exchange of messages, and, therefore, adequate cryptographic protocols are
needed to facilitate secrets exchange. Earlier protocols were based on the gradual exchange
of their secrets bit-by-bit in an interleaving manner. This process continues until both of
them have received and released all the bits; but only after the end of the protocol, both the
individuals can discover that the received bits are real secrets and are not erroneous[1, 4].
1.4 Our Contribution
In this thesis, we have contributed the following:
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• We have proposed a new Contract Signature Scheme based upon key Exchange. We
have analyzed the security of the scheme and also implemented it.
• We have compared and tabulated the performance efficiency of the existing scheme [1]
and the proposed contract signature scheme.
1.5 Motivation
The motivation for this project came from the growing need for a contract signature scheme
that can assure maximum possible security from the existing schemes. In cases where the
signature protocol is executed unsuccessfully, each of the two parties involved cannot show
the validity of the intermediate results produced by the other party to the outsiders. This
scheme also satisfies some desirable security features, such as, fairness, timely termination,
compatibility, and high performance.
1.6 Objective
The objective of my work is to generate a fair and secure contract signature scheme so to
allow the two parties namely, party A and party B, to interact with each other efficiently.
1.7 Organization of thesis
In Chapter 2, in this chapter we have given the mathematical preliminaries which have been
used throughout the thesis.
In Chapter 3, we have given the literature survey which includes the review of a exist-
ing contract signature scheme and the implementation of Harn’s Scheme.
In Chapter 4, we have proposed our new contract signature scheme. Also the security
analysis and the implementation result has been given in this chapter.
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In Chapter 5, we provide conclusion of this thesis and future research directions.
Chapter 2
Mathematical Preliminaries
Following basic notations, definitions and models are used throughout this thesis.
2.1 Notation and Terminology
All groups discussed in this thesis are assumed to be abelian. Groups of prime order have
useful properties and are widely used in cryptography. All groups of prime order are cyclic.
A group G is said to be cyclic if there is an element g ∈ G, such that for each g′ ∈ G,
there is an integer a with g′ = ga. Such an element is called a generator of G. For any prime
integer p , the field of integers modulo p is denoted by Zp. The cyclic multiplicative group
of nonzero elements in Zp is denoted as Zp∗.
2.2 Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)
Particularly in abstract algebra and its applications, discrete logarithms are group theoretic
analogues of ordinary logarithms. An ordinary logarithm log(a, b) gives a solution for the
equation ax = b over the real or complex numbers. Likewise, if g and h are elements of a
finite cyclic group G then a solution x of the equation is called a discrete logarithm to the
base g of h in the group G. Briefly, if G is a finite group, the problem discrete logarithm is
the following computational problem: given elements α and β in G , determine an integer x
such that, αx = β , provided that such an integer exists[9].
7
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2.3 Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem
The Diffie-Hellman problem can be described as follows. Let G be a cyclic group of order
q. If g is a generator of some group, preferably the multiplicative group of a finite field,
and x,y are randomly chosen integers then CDH assumption states that, given (g, ga, gb) for
any randomly chosen generator g and a, b ∈ {0, ..., q − 1} it is computationally infeasible to
compute the value of gab[13].
2.4 The Integer Factorization Problem
There are many fast algorithms for multiplying two given large prime numbers. On the
other hand, it is considerably difficult to find the prime factors if the product of two large
primes is given. The perceptible difficulty of factoring large integers forms the foundation
of some modern cryptographic algorithms. If quick factorization of large primes is possible,
these algorithms would not be secure anymore[16].
2.5 Safe Primes
Their relationship with the strong primes is what makes them safe prime. By definition a
prime q is said to be a strong prime if q + 1 and q − 1 both have large prime factors. For a
safe prime, q = 2p+1 , the integer p is a large prime factor. The importance of safe primes
is realized when they are used in discrete logarithm-based techniques like Diffie-Hellman key
exchange. If 2p + 1 is a safe prime, the multiplicative subgroup of numbers modulo 2p + 1
has a subgroup of large prime order. Safe primes are used to minimize the modulus[15].
Chapter 3
Literature Survey
A number of protocols have been proposed till date to achieve fair message exchange. His-
torically, the protocol design has been evolved from the two-party approach, without the
involvement of any trusted third party (TTP), to the TTP-based approach, where fairness
is guaranteed with the involvement of a TTP. A major disadvantage associated with the
two-party approach is that many numbers of exchange rounds are required to ensure an
acceptable level of fairness; thus the overhead of communication becomes very high. In
addition, gradual secret release protocols require all participating parties to have approxi-
mately equal level computational power in order to guarantee fairness in message exchange.
Otherwise, the party with greater computational capabilities can launch a brute-force at-
tack after receiving the first few bits, and work out the remaining bits of his counterpart’s
message/secret[4].
A contract signature is a digital signature generated by multiple signers, jointly with
their private keys [1]. Multi signature allows any number of signers to work together to
create a digital multi-signature corresponding to a message [7]. The length of digital multi-
signature is equal to the length of each signature, and the public key of multi-signature is
equal to the multiplication of all public keys of signers. A contract signature is a special
form of digital multi signature that only involves two signers [1].
Chen et al. [3] proposed the concept of concurrent signature, which allows two parties,
9
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without TTP, to produce and exchange two ambiguous signatures which are vague for any
third party until one of the parties release an extra piece of information (called keystone)
. A Concurrent signature is very efficient and requires neither a TTP nor a high degree
of interaction between individuals. Later, the concept of perfect concurrent signatures was
established by [5] and subsequently, asymmetric concurrent signature was also proposed by
[6].
3.1 Review of Harn’s Scheme [1]
Lein Harn and Lin [1] proposed a notion of contract signature used in e-commerce applica-
tions. They proposed a contract signature protocol based on the discrete logarithm problem
and assumption. The contract signature protocol adopts a digital multi-signature scheme
in public-key cryptography to ensure fair signature exchange over a network. This proposed
solution allows many signers of a contract signature to transfer their partial signatures that
are entirely ambiguous for any third party (i.e.,1 out ∞ of ambiguity) to generate a valid
contract signature. In case any signer releases the partial signature to others, the signer
does not bind to the contract.
3.2 Protocol for construction of a Contract Signature
3.2.1 System set-up
Let A and B agree to sign a contract m over Internet. We assume that A’s private key is
xA, public key is yA = gxAmodp, and B’s private key is xB, public key is yB = gxBmodp.
3.2.2 Exchange Protocol
Step 1: A randomly selects a secret kA, and computes a public value rA = gkAmodp. rA is
sent to B.
Step 2: In the same way, B randomly selects a secret kB, and computes a public value
rB = g
kBmodp. rB is sent to A.
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Step 3: A computes r = rA.rBmodp. A solves sA such that sA = xAh(m, r)−kArmodp−1.
sA is sent to B.
Step 4: B verifies yh(m,r)A = r
r
A.g
sAmodp. If it is, then B computes r = rA.rBmodp, and
solves sB such that sB = xBh(m, r)− kBrmodp− 1. sB is sent to A.
Step 5: A verifies yh(m,r)B = r
r
B.g
sBmodp. Both A and B can now compute the contract
signature (r, s), where s = sA+ sBmodp− 1, of the contract m.The contract signature (r, s)
of the contract m can be verified by a verifier by checking (yA.yB)h(m,r) = rr.gsmodp.
Theorem 1. The combination of two partial signatures (rA, sA) and (rB, sB), in above
protocol is a valid signature.


















h(m,r) = rr.gsmodp, (3.4)
where r = rA.rBmodp and s = sA + sBmodp − 1. Thus the combined signature (r, s) is a
valid contract signature of contract m.
3.3 Security discussion of the Existing Scheme
In this proposed scheme, the partial signatures(rA, sA) and (rB, sB) have no binding to any
signer. Verifier cannot tell who is the signer because anyone, without knowing the private key






This type of ambiguity, 1 out of∞ ambiguity, can provide entirely ambiguous. On the other
hand, the signature (r, s) binds to both signers since to generate a valid pair of (r, s) to
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satisfy (yA.yB)h(m,r) = rr.gsmodp, needs to know the private key,x = xA + xB of the public
key.
3.4 Implementation result of Harn’s scheme
The existing scheme is implemented in Java using BigInteger package. The signing and the
verification phase has been shown.
Figure 3.1: Screen shot of the output.
Chapter 4
The Proposed Contract Signature
Scheme
In this section, a contract signature scheme based on exchange protocol is proposed which
allows two participants, namely, A and B, to interact with each other to sign a contact
m over the Internet. The proposed scheme has two phases, Key generation and Exchange
protocol. We assume that a contract m has been agreed between A and B before signing
it. Moreover, it is assumed that the contract explicitly contains the following information:
a predetermined but reasonable deadline, and the identities of A and B.
4.1 Key Generation
The operations of Key generation phase are described below.
In this phase the two parties (A and B) generate their private keys (xa and xb) and public
keys (ya and yb), where, ya = gxa mod p and yb = gxb mod p.
4.2 Exchange protocol
The operations of this phase are described below.
A computes its contract signature as:
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Then sends sa to B.
After receiving sa, B checks its authenticity, by verifying the following condition.




a ) mod p) (4.1)
If the above condition holds good, then B computes its contract signature as:
sb = H(m, y
s′′
b mod p)
Then sends sb to A.
After receiving sb, A verifies if the following condition is true.




b ) mod p). (4.2)
In this way both A and B compute their contract signature and execute the protocol
successfully.
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4.3 Implementation Results
Figure 4.1: Key Generation Phase
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Figure 4.2: Exchange Protocol
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Figure 4.3: Signature Generation and Verification
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Figure 4.4: Contract Signature Protocol in Client Server Model: Server
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Figure 4.5: Contract Signature Protocol in Client Server Model: Client
Figure 4.6: Length and Time for Signature Generation
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4.4 Security Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
In this section, we first show the security assumptions of the proposed scheme. Then we dis-
cuss the correctness of the scheme. Subsequently, the performance of the proposed scheme
is discussed.
Definition 1: Discrete logarithm problem (DLP). Let p be a large prime number and
g be a generator of order p − 1 in Zp∗. Given g, y and p, it is difficult to compute the
exponent x from y = gx mod p [2].
Correctness : The contract signature (r, s) of contract m is indeed correct.

















We compared the performance of the exchange protocol of the proposed scheme with
Harn’s scheme [1] and the result is tabulated in Table 4.1. The complexity of any signature
scheme mostly depends on four operations, namely, exponentiation, multiplication, inverse
operation and hash functions. In this evaluation, the time for performing modular addition
and subtraction computations are ignored. The following notations are used to analyze the
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performance of the schemes.
• TE is the time for modular exponentiation
• TM is the time for modular multiplication
• TI is the time for modular inverse operation
• TH is the time for performing hash functions
In our experiments we used p = 256 bits and the length of the signature generated is 159
bits.
Phase Harn’s scheme [1] Proposed scheme
Exchange Protocol 8TE + 9TM + 2TH 8TE + 7TM + 2TH
Publicly verifiable 3TE + 2TM + 1TH 3TE + 4TM
Table 4.1: Performance Comparison
Phase Harn’s scheme [1] Proposed scheme
Signature and Verification 26ms 15ms
Table 4.2: Time Comparison (in millisecond)
It is observed from Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 that, the computational cost of the proposed
scheme is considerably reduced as compared to Harn’s scheme[1].
Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Scope
In this thesis, we proposed a new digital contract signature scheme that allows two dishonest
parties to exchange their signatures on a contract in an efficient and secure manner. The
proposed protocol is abuse-free, i.e., if the signature protocol is not executed successfully,
both the parties cannot show the validity of intermediate results generated by the other party
to outsiders, during or after the procedure where those intermediate results are output. In
other words, each party cannot convince an outsider to accept the partial commitments
coming from the other party. This is an essential security property for contract signing,
especially in the situations where partial commitments to a contract can be beneficial to a
deceptive party or an outsider. Also, this scheme is registrant against some active attacks,
such as forgery attack and adaptive chosen-message attack. Moreover, the proposed scheme
satisfies some desirable security features, such as fairness, timely termination, compatibility,
and high performance. The proposed scheme can also be used to implement an electronic
transaction between two parties fairly. That is; it is guaranteed that the purchaser gets the
digital goods from the store if and only if the store gets the money from the purchaser. In
future research can be done on my scheme to lower its computation cost and communication
overhead. Also, research can be done to incorporate contract signature protocol to highly
security sensitive applications like e-bidding, e-voting, e-transactions etc.
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